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As the pluralization in the title of MITECS suggests, and as many reviewers have
noted, the stance that we adopted as general editors for this project was ecumenical. We
were particularly concerned to generate a volume whose range of topics and perspectives
indicated that “cognitive science” was different things to different groups of researchers,
and that many even fundamental questions remain open after at least four decades of
various interdisciplinary ventures. Implicit in this view is a wariness of any putative magic
key to understanding the complexities of cognition in all of its diversity, and the hope
that by providing a forum in which this range of work could be reviewed by anyone with
time and inclination, the field as a whole would be better positioned to reflect on its future
directions.
Readers of the preceding reviews might be interested in a few words about the
development of the project. Contracted in the early summer of 1995, MITECS began as
a volume projected at half of its eventual size, but with roughly the same scope it has
in published form. The general editors, Frank Keil and myself, had been thinking about
a volume of this sort independently over the preceding year or so, and so much of the
structure of the volume was already outlined by mid-1995. Thus, we were able to move
relatively quickly in the second half of 1995 to assemble a team of 9 advisory editors for
the six sections that constitute the organization of the volume; as reviewers have noted,
the presence of these sections in the print version is manifest primarily by the six overview
essays that occupy the first 100 or so pages in MITECS. (I ended up serving as the advisory
editor for Philosophy from almost halfway through the project due to the inability of the
initial advisory editor to continue and the difficulty of enticing any other sane person to
take on the job at that stage.) Articles were commissioned in two rounds, an initial round
of around 120 articles late in the Spring of 1996, followed by another round of invitations
about a year later, once we had had the opportunity to read over those already written.
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Pre-production work for the project was completed late in the Spring of 1998, following
an extensive period of review and revision. The high level of cooperation we received from
authors, as well as the hard work of the advisory editors (and our willingness to forego
some articles that were just too long in coming), were crucial to the timely completion of
the project.
Links to other MITECS articles within the text of any given article were made largely by
authors; links to MITECS articles that appear at the end of each article were added largely
by me. After publication, MIT Press staff added to the on-line version the useful links at
the end of each article that refer to non-MITECS sources.
The idea of having the majority of articles coming in at around 1000 words or so of text
(i.e., about a page) was crucial to containing the project to a single volume while trying
to cover all of the ground we deemed relevant to it. Although we added approximately
20% more articles than we initially had planned, the chief increase in length came through
reference lists, a policy of allowing authors about a 20% leeway in their assigned lengths,
and an increase in the number of articles that we initially projected at 1500 and 2000 words
in length. Other aims of the somewhat tight length constraints on individual articles were
to facilitate accessibility to a broad audience, and to increase the probability that promised
articles would be written within the assigned time frame. In general, the depth of a topic
and its coverage within the cognitive sciences are represented in MITECS by the number
of articles in any given topic cluster, which are often identifiable from the links for each
article. (Since, however, another function of the links is to draw attention to contrastive
or more distantly related topics, one can’t simply read such clusters off from the links
themselves.)
In a project such as this, we didn’t expect (and didn’t aim) to please all of the people all
of the time. But what has been consolation so far is to learn not only that a fairly strong
version of the existential quantifier would be in place in restating that adage (“nearly all”),
but that many students and researchers alike have found MITECS helpful in their day-to-
day work. As the reviews by Carr (on articles relating to ethology) and Dorr (on articles
relating to natural language processing) indicate the coverage given to particular topics is,
in general, accurate, relatively representative of the field, and at times provocative, even if,
as Dorr suggests, there are various ways in which the volume could be further improved.
Without discussing particular articles, the review by Okamoto implies the same of the 78
articles that fall under the “Linguistics and Language” section of MITECS, though Lakoff
expresses a dissenting view.
Okamoto and (especially) Dorr also point to user-friendly (and not so friendly) features
of the on-line version of MITECS. Husbands and Peterson also were able to report on
the pros and cons of actually using MITECS on-line, something that many readers will
appreciate, since at least until the paperback version is issued this summer (at an affordable
US$ 65), an on-line subscription (at US$ 25 for 6 months) is the only affordable form of
access to MITECS for individual users.
There is a common theme—a surprising one to me in reviews for Artificial Intelli-
gence—that emerges from each of the lengthier reviews published here, those by Hus-
bands, Peterson, and Lakoff: that despite our ecumenical efforts, there are shortcomings
that turn on, in Husbands’s phrase, “the over reliance on computation as a framework to un-
derstand and build intelligence”. Peterson characterizes MITECS as “a book for believers”,
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suggesting that “the future credibility of cognitive science may depend on its engagement
with computationalism as a useful but perhaps limited and even superficial doctrine”, while
Lakoff sees MITECS as too firmly anchored to what he calls the “formalist nativist para-
digm” to convey much of The Truth (known to aficionados as Cognitive Linguistics). Each
of these reviews suggests rather different ways in which MITECS could better achieve its
ecumenical goal, but rather than comment on that, let me respond in the time and space
available to the general criticism.
It seems worth asking three questions about the centrality of computation or a
computational framework to MITECS: How central is that framework to the volume as
a whole? Does its presence constitute an indefensible bias?; and, What does this imply for
the putative ecumenicism of the volume?
Computation is certainly a central notion to MITECS and to the cognitive sciences, both
historically and as research in them is actually often undertaken. Its centrality to MITECS
is manifest not only in the presence of 81 articles gathered under the “Computational
Intelligence” section, but also in computational perspectives represented in all of the other
sections, including articles on “computational linguistics” (Avarind Joshi), “computational
neuroanatomy” (Eric Schwartz), and “modeling neuropsychological deficits” (Martha
Farah). There are three things about this coverage worth underscoring in this context.
First, even counting liberally (which is perhaps how a reader of Artificial Intelligence
might be inclined to count here), only between one-quarter and one-third of all articles in
MITECS cover topics that could reasonably be considered computational in their nature.
Second, as the few examples already cited suggest, the perspectives covered within this
general group of articles are amazingly diverse. They cover the application of computation
to single neurons (Christof Koch), to psycholinguistics (Dennis Norris), to vision (Ellen
Hildreth, Dan Huttenlocher), to cultural representations (Naomi Quinn), and to the use
of cognitive artifacts (Ed Hutchins). They cover perspectives perhaps closer to that of
“good old fashioned AI” (∼ 40 articles), those that adopt a connectionist orientation
(∼ 30 articles), those that represent harder-to-classify, typically newer, perspectives
(around 20 articles: examples include “lightness perception” [Alan Gilchrist] and “sentence
processing” [Paul Gorrell]), as well as those that discuss general computational notions
(examples: “algorithm” [Eric Dietrich], “computation” [Brian Cantwell Smith], “logic”
[Jon Barwise]).
Third, many of the articles are critical of traditional and/or more circumscribed
construals of the notion of computation within cognitive science. For example, articles
on foundational aspects of the role of computation in cognition, such as “computation
and the brain” (Pat Churchland and Rick Grush), “computational theory of mind” (Steven
Horst), and “rules and representations” (Terry Horgan and John Tienson)—all written by
researchers whose critical views of standard computationalist views of the mind are well-
known, views reflected in these articles—can be found in the Philosophy section. Articles
that mark more radical departures from computational work, such as the vast majority of
those in the section Culture, Cognition, and Evolution, are also plentiful.
Which brings me to the second question: is whatever concentration there is on
computational frameworks a problematic bias, one that needs to be corrected (as both
Peterson and Lakoff imply)? Even in light of what I have said above, one might maintain
that such a bias exists. First, one might simply think that MITECS over-represents the
226 R.A. Wilson / Artificial Intelligence 130 (2001) 223–229
status of computation in the field in general, unfairly displacing some other more central
notion within the cognitive sciences. This view is intimated by Lakoff (e.g., see point 8 in
his review, more of which in a moment), but it reflects either an unfamiliarity with MITECS
as a whole, or a skewed take on the cognitive sciences as a whole, or both. Second, one
might think that the centrality of computation distorts the view presented of one or more of
the contributing disciplines or its subfields. This, I think, rather than the previous point, is
Lakoff’s real beef: in particular, that MITECS does not adequately represent the tradition
of cognitive linguistics and “embodied cognitive science”. Third, one might think that
MITECS should do more by way of pointing the way beyond the computational metaphor
in thinking about cognition in a systematic way, and so should downplay computational
perspectives even further. This is the sort of view, reading between the lines a little,
conveyed at the end of the reviews by Husbands and Peterson.
To take this last point first, there are several problems. For one, it is part of the very
ecumenicism underlying the project to arouse scepticism about the claim that there is any
one, or even small number, of ways forward across the whole of the cognitive sciences.
For two, there is an inherent, conservative bias in a project such as MITECS, which aims
primarily to reflect what has been and is being done, achieved, claimed, argued, rejected,
and to convey some sense of how all of this is happening. (Thus it is MITECS, not the
rather less catchy MITEPFDCS, The MIT Encyclopedia of Possible Future Directions for
the Cognitive Sciences.) We were particularly wary of producing a volume of articles on
the latest fads and trends concerning cognition. The only particular future-oriented bias
consciously built into the structure of MITECS from the outset was the inclusion of the
50 or so articles in the section “Culture, Cognition, and Evolution”. This reflected my
own view that the virtual disappearance from cognitive science of anthropological research
and, more generally, work in the social sciences, was problematic, and that one corrective
would be to include a section in MITECS dedicated to the potentially chaotic cacophony
of voices in that kneck of the woods. Other forward-looking themes emerged in some of
the section introductions: for example, Stuart Russell and Mike Jordan’s view that much of
the most interesting work in computational intelligence would move beyond the divide
between GOFAI and connectionism, and Tom Albright and Helen Neville’s only half-
joking prediction that “if cognitive neuroscience fulfills its grand promise, later editions
of this volume may contain a section on history, into which all of the nonneuro cognitive
science discussion will be swept” (lxix). In short, although MITECS does undertake some
constructive work directed at the future directions that the cognitive sciences might take,
that was not its chief intended focus.
This brings me to Lakoff’s view that MITECS fails to do justice to the perspective
of cognitive linguistics, being entrapped—as the MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive
Sciences—within the confines of a “formalist nativist view” of language and cognition.
Lakoff’s insensitivity to the empty category “Press” following “MIT” in the title of the
volume is perhaps understandable; it is something that has, in fact, managed to elude
other readers. But speaking of the volume as a whole, the ties of the project to MIT,
the institution, are more minimal than one might think. With the exception of Michael
Jordan (at UC Berkeley for the last few years but at MIT for the preceding decade), none
of the advisory editors and neither of the general editors have primary connections with
MIT, either presently or in the past. Fewer than 20 contributors are on the faculty at
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MIT, half of these being from the Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences there. (For
comparison, there are more contributors from UCSD and the Salk Institute combined than
from MIT.) The only other direct MIT influence on the project was through the influence
of the Press’s then executive editor, Dr. Amy Brand, whose doctorate is from MIT, and
who made several helpful additional suggestions for articles and authors in the area of
linguistics and language. This was chiefly by way of calling our attention to some blind
spots, once we had commissioned almost all articles. Examples here include “meter and
poetry” (Samuel Jay Keyser) and the awkwardly titled “parameter-setting approaches to
acquisition, creolization, and diachrony” (Michelle DeGraff). Many readers have found the
idiosyncratic nature of such articles, and the articles themselves, thought provoking. This
sort of fine-tuning happened in all 6 sections of MITECS and, across all sections, I see no
MIT or even “East Coast” bias. The claim that the volume in general reflects a “formalist
nativist view” of cognition, particularly one shaped around or by people associated with
MIT, is indefensible. In fact, Lakoff’s own fixation on the dichotomy between “formalist
nativist views” and Cognitive Linguistics is not only antithetical to the ecumenicism of
MITECS; it also reflects a yawningly dated view of where the cognitive sciences are at,
and doesn’t seem to me productive.
Still, let us further explore the idea that MITECS manifests a “formalist nativist” bias.
The section Computational Intelligence aside, where such a case might more plausibly
be made is with respect to the articles in Linguistics and Language, although I disagree
with Lakoff over how deep or problematic this orientation is. In articles that cluster
around the topics of phonology and syntax, what we might call “formalist nativist
views” are predominant. Even here, however, MITECS offers (a) coverage of a range
of accounts of grammar—from “minimalism” (Howard Lasnik), to “head-driven phrase
structure grammar” (Georgia Green), to “lexical functional grammar (Mary Dalrymple),
to categorial grammar (Mark Steedman)—as well as (b) several lengthier articles, such
as “generative grammar” (Geoff Pullum) and “typology” (Bernard Comrie), that express
strong reservations about views of language that miff Lakoff. In retrospect, the overall
coverage of topics on language strikes me as quite broad and representative, especially once
we consider topics (e.g., on aspects of language processing, or on language and culture)
that fall under the auspices of sections other than Linguistics and Language, together with
those selected within that section.
What Lakoff’s review points to, as much by way of exemplification as indication, is
the fractious nature of linguistics, something drawn to my attention at several points
throughout the project. Linguistics was the only contributing discipline over which a
series of battles were fought—from unsolicited, strongly worded recommendations from
linguists (not necessarily contributors) either for topics or contributors, to the intransigence
of some contributors to round out the coverage offered within their articles. Although
this inflexibility was manifest only by a small minority of contributors within Linguistics
and Language, it comported with a general pattern of passionate and at times ferocious
dedication to one or another One True View on some particular topic in linguistics, a
passion and ferocity unmatched by contributors from all other disciplines combined. There
are interesting sociological (or perhaps psychological) questions about this phenomenon,
for I gather from various sources that deeply felt and expressed disagreements about one
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or another One True View are a general feature of professional life in linguistics. (And gee,
I thought we got worked up about things in Philosophy.)
As for Cognitive Linguistics (CL) itself, readers now have, courtesy of Lakoff, a sample
bibliography of recent work within CL to make some judgments of their own. MITECS
itself contains over a dozen articles that discuss CL, including “semantics” (Barbara
Partee), “semiotics and cognition” (Patrizia Violi), “language and communication” (Susan
Duncan), and “metaphor and culture” (Naomi Quinn). As Lakoff points out, the article
“cognitive linguistics” (Karen van Hoek) does a fine job of providing an overview to the
CL approach, mentioning and thus (importantly) pointing readers to several key concepts
and approaches within CL, including that of construction grammar, mental spaces, and
cognitive grammar. While we might have commissioned additional articles on these and
other CL-ish topics, that is also true of many other paradigms, approaches, and views, and
in our editorial view there was nothing to warrant picking out CL as special here. Had CL
emerged as being as central to the cognitive sciences as it is portrayed as being by Lakoff,
we think that this would have emerged from the articles by the more than 400 contributors
to MITECS. We would then have looked, through last minute fine-tuning, to have provided
CL with more explicit coverage than it has, as we did in several other cases. But it didn’t,
and so we didn’t.
Lakoff’s own characterization of the state of play here deserves some comment.
Although he purports to convey “results” of CL under eight headings, few of these
could be said to be results in any reasonable sense of the term. (For example, what
sort of result is “4. A Neural Theory of Language has been outlined and is under
development”, or “6. Language acquisition makes fundamental use of the opulence of the
substrate:”?) In general, as one moves further through both this set of points and Lakoff’s
bibliography, matters become more puzzling, even misleading. To take the most extreme
case, “8. Applications of these [CL] ideas are currently taking central stage in rethinking
traditional disciplines”, turns out to correlate with “C. Applications” in the bibliography,
where one finds 22 books or articles listed (not bad for coverage of 5 distinct fields),
only 2 of which are published work not by Lakoff or one of his co-authors. Speaking
for Philosophy, my own field, it is either disingenuous or delusional to represent any
of the works listed there as having had more than passing interest to the vast majority
of philosophers interested in cognitive science. Of the 79 articles in the Philosophy
section in MITECS, few (if any) discuss the work of Cognitive Linguists (though Mark
Johnson’s work on moral imagination is mentioned in the list of further readings for “moral
psychology” [Jon Deigh]). Given that more than 70 of the leading figures in Philosophy
with an interest in the cognitive sciences are represented here as authors, one more sanguine
about one’s own influence than Lakoff appears to be might infer that the message of CL has
not (yet?) been taken to heart by such philosophers. Whether this is a “formalist nativist”
bias readers can judge for themselves.
Lakoff’s review is systematically misleading in another way. The descriptive and
bibliographical parts to Lakoff’s review both begin with claims and work central to the
cognitive sciences—well-represented in MITECS—but go on to point to more contentious
and peripheral work as they progress. The descriptive part of the review begins by
reminding readers of fundamental work on concepts and categorization (apart from
MITECS articles under those titles by, respectively, James Hampton, and Douglas Medin
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and Cynthia Aguilar, see also “color categorization” [Paul Kay], “language and culture”
[Steve Levinson], and “linguistic relativity hypothesis” [John Lucy]). One direction in
which this work led, as Lakoff says, is to CL “and an embodied cognitive science”.
Now, while the idea of an “embodied cognitive science” has been taken seriously
within recent work in cognitive science (see, for example, “situated/embeddedness”
[Brian Cantwell Smith], “situated learning and cognition” [Colleen Seifert], “dynamic
approaches to cognition” [Tim van Gelder], “behavior-based robotics” [Maja Mataric], and
“individualism” [Rob Wilson]), CL represents only one of a number of ways to express the
idea. It remains extremely unclear either how to unify these competing conceptions, or
which, if any, provides the most promising way to develop it systematically. Likewise,
there are many ways in which language is shaped by factors beyond the “syntax box”,
to pick up on Lakoff’s “2. Language is also shaped by embodiment”, but again the CL
development of this idea remains just one amongst many alternative frameworks for doing
so.
Turning to the bibliographical section of the Lakoff review, readers might try out the
MITECS search engine to explore what sort of coverage MITECS gives to topics such
as metaphor and categorization (A.1–A.4 on Lakoff’s list), or the work listed under “B.
The Neural Theory of Language and Structured Connectionism”. They won’t, however,
find much on Fillmore’s notion of framing (A.5), Fauconnier’s mental spaces (A.6), or
Langacker’s cognitive grammar (A.7), as I have already said, for much the reason that they
won’t find much on “PRO-drop”, “situational semantics”, or “wide computationalism”.
Again, readers themselves can judge whether these constitute serious omissions.
As a final reality check, readers might find it useful to see what sort of coverage is
given to CL and embodied cognition within not only the volumes that Husbands usefully
mentions—those by Osherson, Gregory, Gazzaniga, and Arbib—but also within volumes
that are perhaps closer direct competitors to MITECS in terms of their focus, such as
Bechtel and Graham’s A Companion to Cognitive Science (Blackwell, 1998), and, shortly,
the projected 4-volume Macmillan Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, edited by Lynn
Nadel, currently in progress.
